My friend Alfredo Watkins has recently had an exchange with the influential contemporary philosopher William Lane Craig about divine simplicity. [1] I shan't discuss Craig's reply in this paper, party because Alfredo did a good job himself [2] but also because I can't take seriously Craig's view, which seems to imply that I don't have a head. [3] Instead, I will respond to one of Alfredo's arguments, and a similar argument by the philosopher and mathematician Alexander Pruss, by showing that they are unsound and evidently unsound to those who aren't already committed to simplicity.
What is the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS)? Alfredo defines what he calls the "minimal" DDS and this is the definition with which I will be working throughout this post:
(DDS): God has no proper parts, either metaphysical or physical. [4]
Metaphysical parts here are things like properties, ontological constituents, etc. Physical parts is obvious enough, but it just means that God isn't made up of things like atoms, or anything else that entails that He can be spatially located.
So what is Alfredo's argument? He argues as follows:
(1) Whatever is non-identical to God is created by God [Premise].
(2) If God has metaphysical proper parts ('parts hereafter'), then at least one of these parts is not created by God [Premise].
(3) Either God has parts or he doesn't [LEM].
(4) Suppose He does have parts [ASM for RAA].
(5) All of God's parts are created by God [by 1].
(6) One of God's parts is not created by God [2 & 4].
Since this is a contradiction, we reject our assumption. Hence:
(7) God has no parts. [5]
Alexander Pruss offers a similar argument:
(1*) Everything other than God Himself is created by God [Premise].
(2*) If God has proper parts, then at least one proper part of God is not created by God [Premise].
(3*) No proper part of God is identical with God [Definition of 'Proper part'].
(4*) If God has proper parts, then there is something that is neither identical with God nor created by God [2 & 3]
(5*) Therefore, God has no proper parts [1 & 4] [6]
Both (1) and (1*) are prima facie plausible, especially for theists. Most theists would grant that God is the creator of everything other than Himself. But I think we can defeat our intuitions here. Upon closer inspection, both (1) and (1*) are palpably false in light of obvious counterexamples.
I take both (1) and (1*) to be equivalent to
(1**) For all x, if x =/= God then x is created by God.
Now, (1**) is false just if there is at least one x such that x =/= God and x isn't created by God. Consider the following counterexamples to (1**).
- Let M be an essential mental faculty had by God. God =/= M. M isn't created by God. So there is at least one x such that x =/= God and x isn't created by God. QED.
To flesh this out a bit more. For those of us who think that God = His mind, consider this argument. God = His mind. M, a mental faculty of His mind, =/= His mind. So, by the transitivity of identity, M =/= God. M isn't created by God, for M is essential to Him and so it is impossible for Him to lack M. But if God created M then it would be possible for Him to lack M. But, this means that there is at least one x such that x =/= God and x isn't created by God.
Here's another.
- Let E be an evil thing that I do as a free agent. E =/= God. E isn't created by God because I, in virtue of my being free, created E, or brought E into being. So there is at least one x such that x isn't created by God.
The premises in this argument are palpably true. God is said to be morally perfect or omnibenevolent. Moreover, God is said to be a perfect being who has no imperfections whatever. Suppose God did create E. Then God creates evil. "Having created evil" is something true of God. This truth about God, or anything, is better to lack than have. Being better to lack than have is sufficient for being an imperfection. So God has at least one imperfection. So God isn't perfect; God is imperfect. But, as we have stipulated, God is perfect. So it is false that God created E; I did. But then (1**) is clearly false, for if E is clearly not identical with God and yet He didn't create it.
Finally,
- Let M* be a mental event produced by a free agent (a thought, say) that isn't God. M* =/= God. M* isn't created by God. So there is at least one x such that x =/= God and x isn't created by God.
Each of the above counterexamples is sufficient to refute (1**). Each of these counterexamples is obviously sound. So the initial plausibility of (1**) is overruled by these arguments.
And so I come back to the title of this post. Nobody who isn't already a proponent of DDS or who isn't already committed to DDS because they are committed to a religion in which it is an essential teaching ought to accept it. Obviously people who accept DDS will accept that God = M. They will accept that God = E or that God created E. They will accept that God = M* or that God created M*. But it ought to be utterly obvious to people not already committed to these views that, for example, God isn't a mental faculty, that God didn't create the evil that I created, that God didn't bring about the mental state that I brought about in my head, etc. So, given the above arguments, it seems that a person would accept (1**) only if they already accepted (7) and (5*). So (1**) seems to beg the question, at least in a weak way.
[1]http://www.reasonablefaith.org/proof-of-divine-simplicity
[2]http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2012/09/reply-to-william-lane-craig-on-divine.html
[3]Craig writes: given a linguistic framework in which we engage in talk of parts, it is unremarkable to affirm that my body, for example, has various parts. But outside that framework, when we ask the metaphysical question, are there really such things as proper parts (parts not identical to the whole), I’m inclined to say, no." So apparently my head doesn't exist.
[4]http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2012/08/minimal-divine-simplicity-and-trinity.html
[5]http://analyticscholastic.blogspot.com/2012/07/william-lane-craig-on-god-and-analogy.html
[6]http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2010/02/divine-simplicity-and-aristotelian.html
It seems that a minimal creation doctrine would say that God creates all contingent entities. That rules out the evil and creaturely mental state counterexamples.
ReplyDeleteThe traditional Augustinian thing to say is that evil doesn't exist but is a privation of God. And if one isn't a deist, one should say that God at least concurs in the free actions of creatures. Or one might take causation to be transitive and then the actions of creatures will count as caused by God.
Dr. Pruss, I appreciate the response! This is similar to how Alfredo responded to me in another forum. I can't say that I am at all convinced. Take the "evil" example. I gave an *argument* that God can't be the creator of E. It seems to me that that argument is sound. So any view that entails that God did create E is false. I take it as an obvious fact that some properties are better to have than lack and some are better to lack than have. Equally obvious is the fact that the property "being the creator of evil" is a property that is better to lack than have. But God, the perfect being, would be imperfect if it were true that He created E. So it is false that God created E. Then it will be true that (1**) is false.
DeleteI do think the first counterexample I offered is the strongest of them.
In terms of privation, I can just say E = a specific murder. But then God would be the creator of that event. And being the creator of that event seems to be a lesser-making property. So the argument will, I think, still pull through.
DeleteEvents are just states or acts of being, it's not something that is an entity in and of itself - at least not according to Thomistic philosophy. If evil is a privation, then it simply does not exist as something to be created. Rather, it is more proper to say that what is in existence as a substance has a potential to be privated of its being or its teleological end/s. Evil is contingent upon being to obtain at all and being is contingent on God to exist at all. Thus, I do not think that particular arguments works to reinforce your point.
DeleteGil, thanks for your reply. There is still one argument above that isn't in contention so far. So I'd like to point that out.
DeleteWith respect to what you've said, I don't have to mention evil. Let E = a murder. Suppose God creates E. Then God is the creator of a murder.
Here is the argument:
'Being the creator of a murder' is a property God has. 'Being the creator of a murder' is a property better to lack than have. Any property that is a property that is better to lack than have is an imperfection. So, God has an imperfection. Anything that has imperfections is imperfect. So, God is imperfect. But, God, by definition, is a perfect being. So, by reductio, it is false that God is the creator of E.
Now, I don't expect this to convince Thomists. Remember, the subject of this post is why non-Thomists and non-proponents of DDS shouldn't be convinced by DDS. I think anyone not already tainted by Thomistic philosophy would think it utterly obvious that God =/= M, E, M*