The *POOF* Argument Against Non-Reductive Materialism + Property Dualism

Non-reductive Materialism (NRM) is probably the dominant view in the philosophy of mind (certainly some sort of materialism is). According to NRM (or so it shall be defined here), there are only material substances (substance monism) and two types of properties: mental and physical (property dualism). The mental properties supervene on physical properties. So, given NRM, something like the following is the case:

(S) If anything x has a mental property M, there is a physical property P such that x has P, and necessarily any object that has P has M. [1]

Now, because NRM is a non-reductive form of materialism, P =/= M in virtue of the fact that M is nonphysical and P is physical.

So if NRM is right there is a point in time t1 at which only physical properties were instantiated (in virtue of the fact that there was a time at which no mental beings existed). Then there is a point in time t2 at which mental, nonphysical properties are instantiated (accordingly, at this time physical supervenience base properties are instantiated). So at t2 *POOF* nonphysical properties are instantiated. So here is the argument:

It is very surprising that nonphysical properties instantiate given that the only substances that exist are material substances. It is not at all surprising that nonphysical properties exist given that there are immaterial substances (indeed, to be an immaterial being necessarily entails the instantiation of nonphysical properties). So the existence of nonphysical properties counts in favor of immaterialism over NRM (or, more accurately, substance monism).

[1] Kim, Jaegwon. Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. (Westview Press, 2011). Pg. 9.