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Does Ought Imply Can?

I was having a conversation with my friend Mike Morrissey that culminated into the following counterexample. I don't know if similar ones already exist, but this is what I thought of last night.

First, what does

(M) Ought implies can.

mean? I take it to be the case that if a person P has an obligation to do A then P ought to do A such that if P doesn't do A then P is morally responsible for not doing A. "P can do A at time t" just means that it is within P's power to do A at t, or that P has the ability to do A at t.  So I take it that the following follows from (M):

(M*) P ought to A at t only if P can do A at t.

Moreover, P can do A at t only if it is logically and physically possible that P does A at t. So if it is physically impossible for P to do A at t then it is false that P can do A at t and, therefore, it is false that P ought to do A at t. Consider the following counterexample to (M).

Suppose P signs a contract willingly. Under the contract, P must pay her rent on a certain time. Given that P signed it willingly, knowing all of the details, including the time at which she must make the payment, she has an obligation to pay the rent at the stipulated time. So P has an obligation to pay rent at a time t2. However, P knowingly and deliberately did not come up with the necessary funds in order to fulfill her obligations. Now let t1 be the millisecond before the time at which she must make her payment. At t1 it is true that P has an obligation to pay her rent at t2 and it is true that P can't pay her rent, for it is physically impossible for her to come up with the funds at t1 given a lack of time. So it is true that P ought to pay her rent and it is false that P can pay her rent. This just is the negation of (M).

This is just a quick reaction and I haven't looked into the relevant literature. So it might well be the case that I am wrong, but this looks prima facie sound. 

Another Modal Argument for Substance Dualism

The possibility of some person knowing everything about your brain entails that you aren't identical to your brain (or any part of it). I think it is obvious that it is impossible for God [1], an omniscient being, to know everything about me. God cannot, for example, know what it is like to be me, for He'd have to be me in order to know this, and this is clearly impossible. [2] So there is, necessarily, at least one fact about me to which God has no access whatever. Given that God is omniscient, it'll follow that, necessarily, there is at least one fact about me to which no person has access (other than myself, of course). But, equally obvious, it is possible that God knows everything about my brain. So there is a possible world W in which God knows everything about my brain. Suppose I = my brain (or some part of it) in W. Consider the following truism: 

(E) For all x and y, if x = y, then, for any person P, P knows everything about x just in case P knows everything about y. 

So, by (E), God knows everything about me in W. But, as we have seen, it is impossible that God knows everything about me. So there is no possible world in which God knows everything about me. Thus, it is false that God knows everything about me in W. Since this is a contradiction, we must reject our assumption. Hence, I ≠ my brain in W. All identity statements are necessary, whence it follows that I ≠ my brain in the actual world. If I were a material being it seems that I would be my brain, or some part of it (e.g. I wouldn't be that chair, or my arm). Since I am not my brain (or any part of it) I am not a material being. If I am not a material being then I am an immaterial being. Therefore, I am an immaterial being. Q.E.D. 

I take it to be an obvious fact that I have a material body with which I causally interact. This material body is not me, for I am an immaterial being. Therefore, it is an independent substance to which I am "attached." So it seems that something like substance dualism is true. 

[1] If you don't like God-talk, replace "God" with any person. So, it is possible for some person P to be omniscient with respect to your brain. 

[2] Because this knowledge is impossible to any person not identical to me, God’s lack of this knowledge doesn’t take away from His being omniscience anymore than God’s not being able to create a rock so heavy He cannot lift takes away from His omnipotence. 

The *POOF* Argument Against Non-Reductive Materialism + Property Dualism

Non-reductive Materialism (NRM) is probably the dominant view in the philosophy of mind (certainly some sort of materialism is). According to NRM (or so it shall be defined here), there are only material substances (substance monism) and two types of properties: mental and physical (property dualism). The mental properties supervene on physical properties. So, given NRM, something like the following is the case:

(S) If anything x has a mental property M, there is a physical property P such that x has P, and necessarily any object that has P has M. [1]

Now, because NRM is a non-reductive form of materialism, P =/= M in virtue of the fact that M is nonphysical and P is physical.

So if NRM is right there is a point in time t1 at which only physical properties were instantiated (in virtue of the fact that there was a time at which no mental beings existed). Then there is a point in time t2 at which mental, nonphysical properties are instantiated (accordingly, at this time physical supervenience base properties are instantiated). So at t2 *POOF* nonphysical properties are instantiated. So here is the argument:

It is very surprising that nonphysical properties instantiate given that the only substances that exist are material substances. It is not at all surprising that nonphysical properties exist given that there are immaterial substances (indeed, to be an immaterial being necessarily entails the instantiation of nonphysical properties). So the existence of nonphysical properties counts in favor of immaterialism over NRM (or, more accurately, substance monism).

[1] Kim, Jaegwon. Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. (Westview Press, 2011). Pg. 9.

Giving Bill O'Reilly His Due

People often point to this video and laugh at  Bill O:

Here is Bill O's basic argument:

1. The tides go in, the tides go out.
2. You can't explain that, never a miscommunication.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Now, this argument isn't valid. But is there something in here that can be used for theism? It seems that Bill O is talking about regularities that exist in the world. It seems that the existence of regularities are not at all surprising given theism, but are surprising given atheism. So "the tides go in and out" is evidence for theism over atheism. So, Bill O might have a future in philosophy. It is certainly a better line than the "who created god" objection.

A Mary Room Style Argument for Substance Dualism

Here I'll show how an argument similar to Frank Jackson's famous "Knowledge Argument" might be used to show that substance dualism is true.

Let's absolve Mary of her color blindness and introduce Jack, an equally brilliant scientist who has also spent his entire life in a black and white room wherein he has learned everything he knows about science. Jack is color blind and has never experienced, say, redness. Suppose we bring a person, call her Jane, into Jack's room who is to be his subject. Jack will study Jane's brain so that he has complete knowledge of it. Suppose further that Jack succeeds: Jack knows everything about Jane's brain. Now, Jane, whilst in the room, experienced redness. Given that Jack knows everything about Jane's brain, has he too experienced redness? It seems not. Jack might know that she experienced redness, but he wouldn't know what it was like for her to have experienced redness. It is also difficult to see how complete physical knowledge about the brain might produce an experience of redness. Suppose now that Jane has in her mind an image of a magnificent work of art, say, the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. Given that Jack has complete knowledge of her brain, does he too learn of that image? Again, it seems not. It seems that Jane is the only person who has access to this experience. It also seems odd to suppose that knowing about all of the physical goings on in the brain entails knowing everything about an image one has in their mind. Where in the brain will you find the image of the Sistine Chapel? So I think it is obvious that Jack might know everything about Jane's brain and still be ignorant of some facts about Jane.

And now we have an argument for substance dualism.

(E) For all x and y, if x = y, then, for any person P, P knows everything about x just in case P knows everything about y.

Suppose Jane = her brain, or some part of her brain. That means that, by (E), Jack knows everything about her brain just in case he knows everything about her. Jack knows everything about her brain. Therefore, Jack knows everything about Jane. But, as we have seen, Jack doesn't know everything about Jane. He doesn't have access to her experience of redness or to her image of the Sistine Chapel, which are two obvious facts about her. Since this is a contradiction, we must negate our initial assumption: Jane =/= her brain.

I think substance dualism becomes clear now. If Jane isn't identical to her brain, or any part of it, then there isn't anything physical to which she is identical (if not her brain she wouldn't be identical to her arm, kidney, or that chair over there). But if she isn't identical to something physical, then she must be identical to something that is nonphysical. This is what I shall call the soul. QED.

From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism

I recently posted an argument for property dualism. Here I shall present another one.

The thought/belief that I have that philosophy is the highest good is an event to which I have privileged access. But suppose the event that is my having this belief just is a physical event. What would this event be on physicalism? This event would have neurophysiological properties and would probably consist in a large number of neurons firing and doing various things. It will also have to have propositional and semantic content if we are to call it a belief. So here is the question. If we were to isolate this event (the neural event) such that we would know everything about it would we be able to give a complete, true description of the thought/belief?

It seems not. For my belief has propositional and semantic properties that cannot be known by observing a neural event. By observation we might be able to explain where each neuron was at some time, and to which synapses it is connected, and its various relations to other parts of the body. We might be able to know similar things about sets of neurons at work. But we wouldn't know that this event was in some way representative of the belief that philosophy is the highest good. Similarly, if I have an vivd image in my mind of a sunset, no amount of observation of the goings on in my brain will entail the knowing of or "seeing" of the image. So knowing everything about some physical event in my brain doesn't entail knowing everything about  my thought, or knowing everything about my image of a sunset (knowledge here includes the experience of the image). So I conclude, where N = some physical event in my brain and T = my thought/image, etc.:

(1) It is false that (you know everything about N) entails (you know everything about T).

So now we can produce an argument:

(E) For all x and y, if x = y, then, for any person P, P knows everything about x just in case P knows everything about y.

This is a formal way of saying that if x = y then if you know everything about x then you know everything about y and vice versa. Now, we have established, I think, that complete physical knowledge about some event in my brain that is correlated with some mental event (my thought) doesn't entail complete knowledge. For you can know everything about this neural event and that knowledge won't entail your knowing the semantic and propositional contents of the thought I am having. You won't be able to, just by looking at my brain, give a complete, full description of my thought. In order for you to be able to do this I must tell you what my thought is.

(2) You know everything about N and you don't know everything about T.

This follows from (1). Let P = "you know everything about N" and Q = "you know everything about T." By (1), ~(P entails Q). So, ~(~P v Q). So, (P & ~Q). This just is "You know everything about N and it is false that you know everything about T. This just is (2).

(3) Suppose N = T. [ASM]
(4) Then, for any person P, P knows everything about N just in case P knows everything about T.  [from E and 3]
(5) You know everything about N. [from 2]
(6) Therefore, you know everything about T. [from 4 and 5]
(7) You don't know everything about T. [from 1]

Since this is a contradiction, we negate our assumption. Hence:

(8) Therefore, it is false that N = T.

But, if T isn't identical with any physical event, then T just is a nonphysical event. So far we have event dualism. What is an event? Events are properties instantiated in substances at times. What makes an event a physical event is that the instantiated properties are physical properties. What makes an event a nonphysical event is that the instantiated properties are nonphysical properties. So, given that there are nonphysical events, there are also nonphysical properties. These events and properties are mental events and mental properties. So both property and event dualism are true.

One might argue that scientists are able to tell us what we are thinking by observing brain patterns, or goings on in the brain. The idea here is that thoughts of a kind k are correlated with neural events of a kind k*. So scientists can say that k when they observe k*. But I don't see why this will work. Scientists don't know that k in virtue of the fact that they know that k* alone. They know that k because they know that k is correlated with k*. They know that k is correlated with k* in virtue of the fact that people report their thoughts and scientists are able to see what happens in their brains when they are thinking.

One might also argue that there might be technology in the future that enables scientists to "read our minds." But this just begs the question. You won't be able to know that I am thinking that philosophy is the highest good just by looking at neurons firing about. This is evident once we realize that different people can have the same thoughts. We can have the same thoughts but different neural events. So how will scientists be able to identify our thoughts with neural events? There can be different neural events for the same thoughts. So this objection isn't very compelling.

In case the above argument isn't convincing, I shall reiterate (briefly) the argument for property dualism in the other post (see link above). Physical events are events to which the subject doesn't necessarily have privileged access. Mental events are events to which the subject necessarily has privileged access. Since something is true of all mental events that is untrue of all physical events, they cannot be the same thing. So mental events are distinct from physical events. It seems to me that these arguments are strong and I think most philosophers today (or perhaps a plurality) are inclined towards property dualism (even though most are still physicalists who think that mental events are ontologically dependent on physical substances/events). But might we get to substance dualism?

If I were a physical being what physical being would I be? It seems that I would be my brain, or some part of my brain. Let B = whatever physical being with which I am supposedly identical. Furthermore, a very brilliant neuroscientist named Jack knows everything about B. Suppose I = B. Then, by (E), Jack knows everything about B just in case Jack knows everything about me. So Jack knows everything about me. But, as I have already argued, Jack won't know T just by knowing some physical event in my brain (he knows this physical event in virtue of the fact that he knows everything about B). If Jack doesn't know that T, then Jack doesn't know everything about me; namely, he doesn't know about what thoughts I am having. So it is both true and false that Jack knows everything about me. Therefore, I =/= B. If I =/= B then there is nothing physical with which I am identical. Thus, I am identical with something nonphysical, which we all call the soul.

So I think we have a good argument here for substance dualism.